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Patenting Life: How the Supreme Court Monopolized Plant Protection
Jarrick Goldhamer

This article explores plant specific legislation dating back to 1930 and argues that,
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred Int'l,
Inc.,1 existing plant protections should have precluded offering utility patents to plants. On May
13, 2013, in its decision in Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court continued to expand
the judicially created right to protect plants under utility patents.2 The Court acknowledged the
conflict created between plant specific legislation and the patent act,3 but discarded any issues
arising as being previously decided in J.E.M. v. Pioneer in 2001.4 However, the J.E.M. v.
Pioneer decision was premised upon the idea that the Patent Act and the plant specific legislation
“established different, but not conflicting schemes.”5 Legislative history regarding plant
protections, particularly commodity plants capable of self-replication, reveals continued efforts
by Congress to place limits on plant protection and deny full patent protection.6 Contradicting
protections offered by utility patents,7 plant patents,8 and plant variety protection certificates9
demand a reexamination of the J.E.M. v. Pioneer decision.10 This paper will examine why the

1

J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (holding that plants are patentable
subject matter within § 101 of the patent act).
2
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1763 (2013) (holding that patent exhaustion is not a defense against
reproduction of “patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder's permission”).
3
Id. at 1767 (The Plant Variety Protection Act, but not the Patent Act, provides exceptions for saving seed.).
4
Id. at 1768 (citing J.E.M. v. Pioneer 534 U.S. 124 (creating a right to save patent protected seed as included in the
Plant Variety Protection Act “would turn upside-down the statutory scheme J.E.M. described”)).
5
Id. at 1767.
6
See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2543 (West 2013) (allowing persons to save seed and "use such saved seed in the production of a
crop for use on the farm of the person"); also See 35 U.S.C.A. § 161 (West 2013) (requiring asexual reproduction
and disallowing protection to tuber-propagated plants).
7
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2013).
8
35 U.S.C.A. § 161 (West 2013).
9
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401-2504 et seq. (West 2013).
10
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. at1767-1768 (“If a sale cut off the right to control a patented seed's progeny,
then (contrary to J.E.M.) the patentee could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed.”).

comprehensive and carefully tailored protections offered by the Plant Patent Act and the Plant
Variety Protection Act are irreconcilable with the protections offered by utility patents.
Part I of this paper will discuss the legislative history of plant specific legislation. Part II
will examine judicial decisions impacting plant protection legislation. Part III will discuss the
Supreme Court’s decision in J.E.M. v. Pioneer and present counter evidence to the Court’s
positions. Part IV will conclude that Congress should amend the plant protection schemes to
indicate that they are the exclusive venues for sure protection.
I.

Congressional Grants of Protection to Plants
Prior to the Plant Patent Act (“PPA”) of 1930,11 patent law was “understood to cover only

inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.”12 When Congress first broadened
patent law to include plants,13 it placed calculated limits on the ability to protect plants and their
progeny.14 The PPA amended the utility patent provision defining patentable subject matter, Rev.
Stat. § 4886:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements
thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct
and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used
by others in this country, before his invention or discovery thereof, ... may ...
obtain a patent therefor.15
Emphasized above, the PPA added plants as a new category of patentable subject matter16 in
addition to the four non-exclusive categories that previously existed.17 The PPA also “amended
Revised Statutes § 4888 by adding: ‘No plant patent shall be declared invalid on the ground of

11

Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, § 1, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 161
(West 2013)) (hereinafter “Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act”).
12
Hearings on H.R.11372 before the House Committee on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. Appendix A (1930).
13
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11.
14
Id. (requiring asexual reproduction of a plant to qualify for patent protection).
15
Id. (emphasis added).
16
Id.
17
Id. (“art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”).

noncompliance with this section if the description is made as complete as is reasonably
possible.’”18 This amendment ensured that plants would be capable of meeting the rigorous
description requirements to obtain patent protection.19 When the PPA was enacted, it was the
exclusive avenue of protection for plants.20
In 1952, Congress recodified patent law into the organizational structure it is known for
today.21 Part of that reorganization separated the PPA requirements of patentability into the
newly created chapter 15 of title 35 of the United States Code §§ 161-164.22 Although PPA
requirements were removed from the code section defining patentable subject matter, 23 the
Supreme Court interpreted the 1952 revision to be “only a housekeeping measure that did not
change the substantive rights or the relaxed requirements for such patents.”24 The statutory
requirements for obtaining a plant patent now read:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new
variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated
state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.25
If an applicant’s plant qualifies under this provision, the PPA grants rights, distinct from general
patent rights, tailored to plants:
In the case of a plant patent, the grant shall include the right to exclude others
from asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering for sale, or selling
the plant so reproduced, or any of its parts, throughout the United States, or from
importing the plant so reproduced, or any parts thereof, into the United States.26

18

J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 132-33 (citing Act of May 23, 1930, § 2, 46 Stat. 376.).
Id. at 134 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311-312 (1980)) (“second obstacle to patent protection
for plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the ‘written description’ requirement”).
20
Hearings on H.R.11372 before the House Committee on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. Appendix A (1930).
21
Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N (66 Stat. 792).
22
35 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-164 (West 2013).
23
35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
24
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 125.
25
35 U.S.C.A. § 161.
26
35 U.S.C.A. § 163 (West 2013).
19

Although separated from the utility patent requirements,27 these alterations were not intended to
alter or expand the scope of patentable subject matter.28
Following the PPA’s limited grant of patent protection to plants, Congress was pressed to
expand protections to sexually reproduced plants.29 In 1967, the “American Seed Trade
Association proposed an amendment to the 1930 PPA by adding ‘or sexually’ to all relevant
sections, expanding the Act's coverage to useful, ‘sexually’ reproducing varieties.”30 However,
Congress rejected the attempt to expand patent protection to sexually reproduced plants.31 In
1970, Congress accepted that “true-to-type reproduction was possible”32 through sexual
reproduction of plants and passed the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).33 The PVPA
extended patent-like protections to:
The breeder of any sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other
than fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the variety, or the successor in
interest of the breeder, shall be entitled to plant variety protection for the variety,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this chapter[.]34
Subject to limitations,35 the PVPA provides infringement an infringement exemption
such that a person may save protected seed and “use such saved seed in the production of a crop
for use on the farm of the person.”36 The PVPA also includes exemptions from infringement for

27

35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 125 (stating that the 1952 revision “did not change the substantive rights”).
29
See Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
247, 284 (2003) (hereinafter “Aoki”) (citing JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000, at 139 (1988) (hereinafter “Kloppenburg”).
30
Id.
31
Id. (stating that the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Land Grant College “agronomists, farmers and public plant
breeders at SAESs opposed this move and effectively killed the proposed amendment.”)
32
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
33
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401-2504 et seq. (West 2013) (originally enacted as Pub.L. 91-577, Title II, § 41, Dec. 24, 1970).
34
7 U.S.C.A. § 2402 (West 2013).
35
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 (1995) (interpreting narrowly the exemption to protect
replanting or selling the seed saved for replanting on the farmer’s own fields).
36
7 U.S.C.A. § 2543.
28

research conducted on protected varieties37 and for private noncommercial uses.38 With the PPA
and the PVPA, Congress created comprehensive bodies of law covering both the asexual and
sexual reproduction of plants.
II.

Judicial Expansion of Patent Protections to Plants
In 1980, the US Supreme Court dramatically overruled the longstanding perception that

living organisms were not patentable subject matter.39 The Supreme Court rejected nearly two
hundred years of patent history which stated that, without a specific statute like the Plant Patent
Act, animate objects were products of nature and therefore outside the realm of patent
protection.40 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the court held that human made micro-organisms could
fall within § 101 patentable subject matter.41 The Court relied on an extremely expansive reading
of the non-exclusive categories in § 101 to conclude that the micro-organism at issue constituted
a “manufacture” or “composition of matter.”42 The Court relied on legislative history that the
Court claimed to state “that Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything
under the sun that is made by man.’”43 Due to decisions of the lower courts,44 the Court framed
the question presented as not pertaining to the difference between the animate and inanimate, but
37

7 U.S.C.A. § 2544 (West 2013) (“The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona
fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this chapter.”)
38
7 U.S.C.A. § 2541(e) (West 2013) (“It shall not be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a variety to
perform any act done privately and for noncommercial purposes.”).
39
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (holding that the petitioner’s “new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature” was patentable).
40
Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1033 (C.C.P.A. 1977) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (“It is our view that 35 U.S.C. § 101 must be strictly construed and, when so interpreted,
precludes the patenting of a living organism.”); Application of Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978) on
reconsideration sub nom. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) and aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (“[T]he
microorganisms are alive and, for that reason alone, not within the § 101 categories of inventions which may be
patented.”).
41
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
42
Id. at 309
43
Id. (citation omitted).
44
Id. at 306 (footnote omitted) (quoting Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977) cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (“‘the fact that microorganisms . . . are alive . . . [is]
without legal significance’ for purposes of the patent law”).

whether the micro-organism at issue was a product of human inventiveness.45 Importantly, the
decision cited previous case law holding that “bacteria were not plants for the purposes of the
1930 Act,”46 therefore, it did not decide what protections were available to plants and other
living organisms.47
Five years later, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) 48 held that plants
were not precluded from obtaining utility patent protection.49 The PBAI, relying heavily on
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, opened the door for patenting most any human made living organism.
The findings of Ex Parte Hibberd50 were thereafter promulgated by the Unites States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO)51 in 1987 stating that “the PTO considers non-naturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the

45

Id. at 313 (“relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human-made inventions”).
46
Id. at 314 (citing In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (1940)); See also 1985 Pat. App. LEXIS 11, 18, (Bd. Pat. App. &
Interferences Sept. 18, 1985):
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals … interpreted the meaning and scope of the term
"plant" in the PPA as having its common, ordinary meaning which is limited to those things
having roots, stems, leaves and flowers or fruits. In our view, tissue cultures manifestly do not
come within the noted "common, ordinary meaning" of the term "plants" and are, therefore, not
within the scope of the PPA (35 USC 161).
47
Id. at 317:
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative
process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide
and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in
our democratic system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government,
the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.
48
35 U.S.C.A. § 134 (West 2013) (conducting non-adversarial hearings, the BPAI (now known as the Patent Board
of Trials and Appeals) presides over cases after an applicant’s claims have been “twice rejected” by the primary
examiner).
49
1985 Pat. App. LEXIS 11 at 7 (“[N]either the PPA nor the PVPA expressly excludes any plant subject matter
from protection under Section 101”).
50
Id.
51
35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2013) (“The United States Patent and Trademark Office is established as an agency of the
United States, within the Department of Commerce” – an organization under the Executive branch).

scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.”52 These decisions form the precedents which the Supreme Court
relied upon when, in 2001, it declared that plants could obtain § 101 utility patent protection.53
III.

The Four Pillars of the Supreme Court’s Expansion of Utility Patent Protection
to Plants
The Supreme Court, in its 2001 J.E.M. v. Pioneer decision, relied on four conclusions to

support its holding that plants were not precluded from § 101 utility patent protection.54 First,
following the reasoning of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, § 101 is to be interpreted very broadly so as
to encompass plants within the meaning of “manufacture” or “composition of matter.”55 Second,
the PPA’s protections are not the exclusive venue for plant patenting. 56 Third, the PVPA’s
protections are not the exclusive venue for protecting sexually reproduced plants.57 Lastly,
Congressional inaction after the Diamond v. Chakrabarty suggests acceptance of judicial
decisions allowing the patenting of plants under § 101.58 Each of these premises will be
discussed and debunked by a thorough examination.59
1. The Four Categories of § 101 Patentable Subject Matter do not Include
Plants
In J.E.M. v. Pioneer, the Court relied on the premise, as put forth in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, that the language of § 101 must be read extremely broadly to encompass “anything
under the sun that is made by man.”60 However, Justice Stevens later criticized this citation of
legislative history:

52

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 710 F. Supp. 728, 729 (N.D. Cal. 1989) aff'd, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 145 (“[N]ewly developed plant breeds fall within the terms of § 101, and that
neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101's coverage”).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 131.
56
Id. at 132.
57
Id. at 141.
58
Id. at 145.
59
The Supreme Court heard the case on appeal by the alleged infringer J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. thus the arguments of
the Court were presented to reject the petitioner’s many arguments made in the alternative.
60
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 148 (quoting S.Rep. No.1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)).
53

Taken in context, it is apparent that the quoted language has a far less expansive
meaning. The full sentence in the Committee Reports reads: “A person may have
‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the
sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101
unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.”61
The Court clearly selectively quoted a small portion of legislative history to achieve far greater
support for its position than an honest quotation would have provided. The Court cannot be
allowed to rely upon this clear misrepresentation of legislative history to justify its massive
judicial expansion of patentable subject matter.
Disregarding the Court’s distortion of history to support its position, the broad language
of § 101 is intended as “a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen
inventions.”62 Plants, at the time of the J.E.M. v. Pioneer decision in 2001, were not a new or
unforeseen area of invention.63 The PPA, enacted more than 20 years before § 101 was created,64
undoubtedly indicates that Congress was apprised of inventions in the realm of plants. In J.E.M.
v. Pioneer, the court concluded that plants could fall within the four non-exclusive categories65
of § 101 that define patentable subject matter. By limiting the examination to patentable subject
matter as defined by the then current version of § 101, the court discarded limitations imposed by
the PPA that were included in the language defining patentable subject matter prior to 1952.66 If
the Court was correct when it stated that the 1952 revision “did not change the substantive rights
or [relax] requirements for such patents,”67 then the scope of today’s § 101 must include the

61

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3249 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
63
35 U.S.C.A. § 161 (granting patent like protections to plants).
64
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11 (enacted 1930, providing patent like protection to new
“asexually reproduced” plants).
65
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”).
66
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11.
67
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 125.
62

limitations placed on patentable subject matter in § 4886 prior to 1952.68 In order to avoid
substantive changes to patent law through the 1952 recodification, §§ 161-164 must be read to
impose limitations excluding plants from the scope of patentable subject matter as defined by
§ 101. The PPA shows clear Congressional appreciation of plant invention before and after the
enactment of § 101 that should have precluded § 101 coverage of plants.69
2. The PPA Should be held to be the Exclusive Venue for Patenting Plants
When enacted, the PPA offered the only available protection for new and inventive
plants.70 The Court argued that “nothing within either the original 1930 text of the statute or its
recodified version in 1952 indicates that the PPA's protection for asexually reproduced plants
was intended to be exclusive.”71 The Court rejected three separate theories, as put forward by the
petitioners, for “why the PPA should preclude assigning utility patents for plants.”72 They are as
follows: (1) plants were not covered by the general utility patent statute prior to 1930,73 (2) “the
PPA's limitation to asexually reproduced plants would make no sense if Congress intended § 101
to authorize patents on plant varieties that were sexually reproduced,”74 and (3) “in 1952
Congress would not have moved plants out of the utility patent provision and into § 161 if it had
intended § 101 to allow for protection of plants.”75

68

Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11. (“invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct
and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant”).
69
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable
subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed.”).
70
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 134 (“plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of
the patent law”).
71
Id. at 132.
72
Id. at 133.
73
Id. at 134.
74
Id. at 135.
75
Id. at 137.

i.

The PPA Provides the Only Form of Patenting Plants Because Plants
Were Not Protected By Patent Law Prior to 1930

Congress did not include text within the PPA to indicate that it was to be the exclusive
venue of plant protection because, when adopted, it was the only available venue for
protection.76 Prior to enacting the PPA, plants were understood to be products of nature 77 and
incapable of meeting rigorous description requirements78 to obtain patent protection.79 In
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court stated that the PPA addressed these perceived barriers by
“relaxing the written description requirement” and confirmed the legislative belief that “the work
of the plant breeder” is patentable.80 Nearly twenty years later, the Court argued that the
enactment of the PPA merely shows that “in 1930 Congress believed that plants were not
patentable under § 101.”81 That Congress believed that plants were not patentable prior to
enacting the PPA casts doubt on the Court’s reasoning rather that supports it. If no other
protections were believed to be available to plants at the time of enacting the PPA, language
indicating the exclusiveness of the PPA would have been superfluous. Additionally, whether
plants “had the potential to fall within the general subject matter”82 prior to 1930 became
irrelevant after the enactment of the PPA.83 There is no room for a broad interpretation of the
patent law when a specific statute has delineated the exact limits of patent protection granted to
76

S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930)) (“The purpose of the bill is to afford agriculture, so far as
practicable, the same opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been given industry.”
(emphasis added)).
77
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 134 (“plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of
the patent law”).
78
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311-312) (“plants were thought not amenable to the ‘written
description’ requirement of the patent law”).
79
Id.
80
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 312.
81
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 134.
82
Id. at 135 (emphasis original).
83
Id. at 152-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–533 (1998))
(holding that a later, specific statute trumps an earlier, more general statute); See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 321 note 4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If the 1930 Act's only purpose were to solve the technical problem of
description referred to by the Court, ante, at 2209, most of the Act, and in particular its limitation to asexually
reproduced plants, would have been totally unnecessary.”).

plants. The PPA conclusively defined the extent which Congress intended patent rights to extend
to plants.
The language of the PPA, amending § 4886, was unambiguous regarding the availability
of plant protection only when a breeder “asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of
plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used by others in this country.”84 The
Court argued that because Congress failed to include unnecessary language denying plant
protection under § 101 that it could use its judicial powers to proclaim those rights to exist. It is
unfortunate that Congress possibly created an ambiguity by relocating the PPA language to a
separate chapter, but the Court should not be allowed to hold a blind eye to history. Unlike the
four categories of § 101 that are non-exclusive,85 plants were added to § 4886 as a new category
of patentable subject matter with language that indicates exclusivity. The four preexisting nonexclusive categories of § 4886 were prefaced with the language “any person who has invented or
discovered” and separated only by commas.86 The PPA added language to § 4886 after a
repetitious use of the phrase “who has invented or discovered”87 which indicates an intentional
separation from the non-exclusive categories of patentable subject matter. Careful consideration
of the text of § 4886 as amended by the PPA indicates the exclusive nature of the statue.
Additionally, the PPA would not have amended § 4886 if the four non-exclusive areas of
patentable subject matter included plants. The Court stated that the PPA addressed two
deficiencies of patent law to allow plants to obtain some limited patent protections.88 In order to
address the written description problems, the PPA amended § 4888 to relax the written
84

Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11.
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 131-32 (stating that plants “fall within the terms of § 101's broad language that
includes ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’”).
86
R.S. 4886 [derived from Act July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 201] amended May 23, 1930, c. 312, § 1, 46 Stat.
376.
87
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11.
88
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 134 (stating that plants were believed to be products of nature and incapable of
meeting written description requirements of patent law).
85

description for plant patent applications.89 To address the product of nature issue, Congress
amended § 4886 which defined statutory subject matter of the patents.90 In order to include
plants, Congress chose to amend the statute defining the categories of acceptable patentable
subject matter. The manner in which Congress implemented the PPA is highly evident of its
intent to create an exclusive venue for patenting plants.
ii.

The PPA Provides the Only Form of Patenting Plants Because the
PPA’s Limitations are Irreconcilable with Granting § 101 Patents for
Plants

The PPA directly amended patentable subject matter to include only asexually
reproduced plants.91 The Court argued that limitations of the PPA merely reflect “the reality of
plant breeding in 1930”92 rather than the calculated bounds of what Congress believed to be
appropriate plant protection.93 The Court stated that it saw “no evidence, let alone the
overwhelming evidence needed to establish repeal by implication … that Congress, by
specifically protecting asexually reproduced plants through the PPA, intended to preclude utility
patent protection for sexually reproduced plants.”94 The Court’s reliance on repeal by implication
is misplaced.95 Justice Breyer, in dissent, noted that repeal by implication has “traditionally been
embraced when a party claims that a later statute—that does not actually modify an earlier
statute—implicitly repeals the earlier legislation.”96 Because the PPA “explicitly amended the
Utility Patent Statute by limiting protection” the canon against repeal by implication has no
89

Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, § 2, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 162
(West 2013)) (“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with section 112 if the description is as
complete as is reasonably possible.”)).
90
R.S. 4886 [derived from Act July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 201] amended May 23, 1930, c. 312, § 1, 46 Stat.
376.
91
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, supra note 11.
92
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 135.
93
Id. at 151 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its
Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TM. OFF. SOC. 621, 635, 644 (2000)) (“The Court's contrary claim notwithstanding, it was
readily apparent in 1930 that a plant's desirable characteristics could be preserved through reproduction by seed.”).
94
Id. at 137 (citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996)).
95
Id. at 155 (Breyer J., dissenting).
96
Id.

relevance.97 Additionally, a separate cannon of the Court states that “a later, more specific statute
will ordinarily trump the earlier, more general one.”98 The explicit amendments of patentable
subject matter by the PPA prior to the creation of § 101 render the Court’s reliance on repeal by
implication an inappropriate.
Granting § 101 utility patents to sexually reproduced plants is irreconcilable with the
limitations placed on plant patentability by Congress. Allowing §101 utility patents essentially
eliminates the “asexual reproduction” requirement of the PPA.99 Contrary to the Court’s
arguments, the PPA can and should apply to all types of plants, both asexually and sexually
reproducing.100 The PPA does not delineate between offering protection to plants that naturally
reproduce asexually or sexually.101 The asexual reproduction requirement in § 161 is a
requirement of invention not an inherent quality of the plant type.102 The asexual reproduction
requirement provides statutory assurance that the novel trait is stable and reproducible.103
Asexual reproduction also provides an essential element of proving plant patent infringement
that is unique from utility patent protection.104 Because of the asexual reproduction requirement,
“independent creation” is a legal defense to infringement of a plant patent.105 However,

97

Id. at 156 (Breyer J., dissenting).
Id. (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 530–533)).
99
35 U.S.C.A. § 161.
100
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independent creation as a legal defense is wholly contradictory to rights granted under a utility
patent.106 The Court characterizes the PPA as implementing limitations only because “Congress
thought that sexual reproduction through seeds was not a stable way to maintain desirable bred
characteristics.”107 Ironically, this quote, intended to support the Court’s position, acknowledges
that Congress considered and rejected extending plant patent protections to sexually reproduced
plants. Under the Court’s interpretation, a plant which naturally reproduces sexually but that had
been asexually reproduced could potentially obtain protection under both § 161 and § 101.
Accepting the Court’s reading of the statute would “virtually nullify the PPA's primary
condition—that the breeder reproduced the new characteristic.”108
In addition to the asexual reproduction requirement, after the 1952 recodification, the
PPA was amended “to preclude patent protection for plants found in an uncultivated state.”109 No
requirement of § 101 utility patents can sufficient account for or reject the patentability of a new,
useful and unique plant found at random in the wild. Requiring plants to be found in a cultivated
state is yet another requirement of the PPA that will be discarded under § 101 utility patents for
plants. Granting plants protection under both § 101 and § 161 would eviscerate the purpose and
limitations of the PPA’s grant of patent protection to plants.
The PPA’s relaxation of the patent application description requirements110 does not
necessarily render § 101 patents more demanding such that greater protections could be
warranted. The Court stated that “advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have
allowed plant breeders to satisfy § 101's demanding description requirement.”111 However, the
106

35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2013) (“right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States”).
107
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 135.
108
Id. at 152 (Breyer J., dissenting).
109
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language of the PPA requiring that the “description is as complete as is reasonably possible”112 is
adaptable to advances in science as is § 101. As science progresses, what qualifies under the
standard of “as complete as is reasonably possible”113 could erode the exemption until the
description requirements equally apply to both plant patents and utility patents. If the Court is
correct that scientific advances allowed plant breeders to satisfy all description requirements,114
then the exemption contained in § 162 relaxing description requirements of plant patents would
be meaningless. But, if § 162 does not in fact lessen the description requirements for plant
patents, then the Court’s argument for greater protections under § 101 due to the more
demanding requirements is moot.
The Court never mentions that § 101 utility patents for plants would negate Congress’
intent to avoid granting patent rights to food115 itself.116 The Court completely failed to address
how the PPA’s explicit restriction against tuber-propagated plants would be reconciled with
availability under § 101 patents. The Legislative history reveals that “[t]his exception is made
because this group [tubers] alone, among asexually reproduced plants, [are] propagated by the
same part of the plant that is sold as food.”117 This seemingly innocuous exemption indicates that
Congress, in 1930, acknowledged the complications of patenting self-replicating commodity
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plants and specifically rejected extending patent protection to those plants.118 By allowing § 101
patents of plants, the Court directly thwarted Congress’ rejection of patent protection to tuberpropagated plants. The failure to so much as consider Congress’ prior attempts to avoid the
availability of § 101 patents over commodity plants was a significant oversight by the Court.
iii.

Congress Would not have Created § 161 if it Intended § 101 to Apply
to Plants.

In 1952, Congress removed the PPA language from utility patent subject matter and
created chapter 15 entitled “Plant Patents” of U.S.C. code title 35 to specify the requirements for
plant patenting.119 Interpreting § 101 to include plants after the 1952 recodification effectuates an
unwarranted expansion of patentable subject matter defined by the four non-exclusive categories
derived from § 4886.120 The Court argued that creating the plant patent section “simply does not
support carving out subject matter that otherwise fits comfortably within the expansive language
of § 101.”121 Although the Court states it is “loath to interpret what was essentially a
housekeeping measure as an affirmative decision by Congress,”122 it is quick to use the
“housekeeping measure” to eliminate the PPA’s limitations on patentable subject matter
previously encoded in § 4886.123 Before recodification, patentable subject matter was directly
limited by the PPA’s language outlining the prerequisites for the patentability of plants.124 The
Court puts forth no evidence of how such a “housekeeping measure” can justify redefining
patentability requirements for plants. § 101 should be read in light of § 161 and should not be
expanded to encompass plants within utility patent protection.
118
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3. PVPA’s Protections Should be Held to be the Exclusive Venue for Protecting
Sexually Reproduced Plants
The PVPA was a compromise enacted to offer sexually reproduced plants patent-like
protections.125 The Court argued that the PVPA could not be held to “restrict the scope of
patentable subject matter under § 101.”126 The Court stated that there was no evidence to support
the “view that the PVPA provides the exclusive means for protecting sexually reproducing
plants.”127 The Court broke down its arguments against PVPA preemption of § 101 protection
for plants as follows: (1) The PVPA does not evidence “Congress’ intent to deny broader § 101
utility patent protection,”128 (2) Dual protection granted by both the PVPA and § 101 is not
irreconcilable,129 and (3) The PVPA does not alter “the subject-matter coverage of § 101 by
implication[.]”130
i.

The Enactment of the PVPA Clearly Indicates Congress’ Intent to
Deny Broader § 101 Utility Patent Protection

By enacting the PVPA, Congress created a “statutory scheme that is comprehensive with
respect to its particular protections and subject matter, giving limited protection to plant varieties
that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable.”131 The Court rejected that such a comprehensive
scheme was intended to be the exclusive venue for protecting sexually reproduced plants. 132 In a
parallel to its rejection of the PPA, the Court argued that nowhere in the PVPA “does it restrict
the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101.”133 As previously argued, no protections were
available under § 101, or any other statute, at the time of enactment and thus any language
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claiming exclusivity by the PVPA would have been superfluous. The Court further argued that
legislative history did no more than reveal that some Members of Congress “believed that patent
protection was unavailable for sexually reproduced plants” because of “a lack of awareness
concerning scientific possibilities.”134 The Court conspicuously failed to disclose that the PVPA
was a legislative compromise by Congress after specifically rejecting legislation to expand
patent protections to sexually reproduced plants.135 In 1967, the "American Seed Trade
Association proposed an amendment to the 1930 PPA136 by adding ‘or sexually’ to all relevant
sections, expanding the Act's coverage to useful, ‘sexually’ reproducing varieties.”137
Congressional actions striking down such legislation should be accepted as strong evidence of
against expanding § 101 coverage to plants. The PVPA was a carefully constructed compromise
to afford patent-like protection to sexually reproduced plants that Congress deemed reasonable
after refusing to extend patent protections.138
ii.

Dual Protection of Plants Between the PVPA and the Patent Act is
irreconcilable

Dual protection is not appropriate due to the significant variance between protections
offered to the same protected plants. In its argument, the Court conflates the overlap of the
protections offered with the overlap of subject matter protected.139 The Court cited to two
examples of other intellectual property areas where it previously allowed dual protection to

134

Id. at 141.
Aoki, supra note 27, at 284 (citing Kloppenburg, supra note 27, at 139).
136
Id. (attempting to alter the language of § 161 rather than propose amendments or new interpretations of § 101 to
obtain protections for sexually reproduced plants).
137
Id. (The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Land Grant College “agronomists, farmers and public plant breeders at
SAESs opposed this move and effectively killed the proposed amendment.”).
138
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2543-2544 (West 2013) (including the right to save seed, research exemption, and personal nonprofit exemption).
139
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 144 (“utility patents and PVP certificates do contain some similar protections, as
discussed above, the overlap is only partial”).
135

support its argument.140 Kewanee Oil v. Bicron addressed whether state trade secret laws were
preempted by federal patent laws.141 Kewanee Oil v. Bicron is highly distinguishable because it
involves two protection schemes which are not available to concurrently protect the same
invention due to disclosure requirements.142 Additionally, Kewanee Oil v. Bicron does not
involve two competing federal intellectual property schemes. Because the PVPA and Patent Act
are both federal intellectual property statutes, as previously argued, “a later, more specific statute
will ordinarily trump the earlier, more general one.”143
Mazer v. Stein144 presents a much more analogous situation to the issue at hand. There,
the Supreme Court held that it was permissible to allow an overlap between Utility Patent and
Copyright subject matter.145 The Court acknowledged differing protections offered under the two
schemes,146 including the right to independent creation under copyright law, but found that the
different laws protected different aspects of the creation.147 Both the PVPA and the Patent Act
seek to protect the same exact aspect of invention – the plant. Neither of the cases cited
supporting dual protection address situations wherein Congress has previously rejected the exact
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protections sought.148 Dual protection should not be afforded when Congress created a
comprehensive alternative body of law providing significant protections in direct response to the
protections sought.
iii.

The PVPA Implicitly Limits the Subject Matter Coverage of § 101

Repeal by implication is presumptively disfavored,149 but appropriate here where
Congress created comprehensive legislation irreconcilable with utility patent protection. The
Court argued that it is “much more difficult to obtain a utility patent for a plant than to obtain a
PVP certificate”150 and thus granting greater protections to plants under § 101 was warranted.151
Whether § 101 actually imposes a stricter standard to obtain protection is not clear on the
record.152 The primary manner in which seeds meet the description requirements of § 101 is by
the deposit of biological materials.153 The Court noted that such deposits of biological material
under § 101 are “publicly accessible,”154 but made special note of the fact that, although the
PVPA also has deposit requirements, “neither the statute nor the applicable regulation mandates
that such material be accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP certificate.”155
The great irony of this statement is that only under the PVPA would public accessibility to the
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deposit provide a public benefit.156 Without any right for another to make or use the protected
plant, the fact that § 101 plants are “publicly accessible” is a farce. The deposit of a utility patent
protected plant only serves to minimize the “stricter standard” of obtaining protection. The
claimed increase of availability and stricter standards of obtaining protection are tenuous.
Regardless, the manner in which a sexually reproduced plant is disclosed is not at issue. The
issue is whether granting patent rights to sexually reproduced plants is irreconcilable with the
PVPA.157
The PVPA was carefully construed to extend protections to sexually reproduced plants
that intentionally do not match rights granted to utility patents. The PVPA contains three
important exclusions to infringement that are not available in patent law: (1) “use and
reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research,”158 (2) a person
may save seed and “use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the
person,”159 and (3) “any act done privately and for noncommercial purposes.”160 The Court
argued that “there is no evidence that the availability of such patents has rendered the PVPA and
its specific exemptions obsolete.”161 However, each of these exemptions includes an act of
making a copy that constitutes infringement of a utility patent.162 The Supreme Court, in
Bowman v. Monsanto,163 confirmed that saving and replanting seeds patented under § 101
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constitutes infringement.164 By rejecting the applicability of the first sale doctrine to plant seeds,
the Supreme Court effectively usurped the legislative process and eliminated the carefully
crafted limitations Congress applied to sexually reproduced plants. In both of these opinions, the
Court contoured its arguments to avoid addressing the impact of any of the irreconcilable
conflicts created by granting utility patents to plants. Granting utility patents to plants ignores
Congressional action165 and effectively eliminates the exemptions in the PVPA.
4. Congressional Action Prior to Diamond v. Chakrabarty Trumps any
Perceived Inaction Thereafter
Congressional action on the specific subject of the protections offered to plants prior to
Diamond v. Chakrabarty should not be discarded due to inaction. The PTO granted utility
patents for plants for nearly 16 years between when Patent Trial Board of Appeals and
Interferences held that plants could be patentable under § 101166 and when the issue reached the
Supreme Court.167 The Court argued that this delay “suggests a recognition on the part of
Congress that plants are patentable under § 101.”168 If Congress had not addressed the
protections to be offered to plants both within patent law with the PPA and outside of patent law
with the PVPA, this argument might hold. But Congress has created and updated comprehensive
plant protection legislation.169 Congress cannot be expected to legislatively respond every time a
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lower court skirts one of its regulations. Statistics previously cited170 for the interim 16 years
suggests that applicants were unsure if the PTO stance of plant patentability would survive
further court scrutiny. Because Congress had definitively addressed protections for plants prior
to lower court decisions, inaction prior to the Supreme Court’s decision cannot be held as proof
that Congress agrees with the Court.
The Court also argued that “1999 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 119” which added plant
provisions to the section regarding international priority dates171 suggests that Congress
recognized utility patent availability for plants. The reliance on this amendment is misplaced.
Section 119(f) reads:
Applications for plant breeder's rights filed in a WTO member country (or in a
foreign UPOV Contracting Party) shall have the same effect for the purpose of the
right of priority under subsections (a) through (c) of this section as applications
for patents, subject to the same conditions and requirements of this section as
apply to applications for patents.172
Simply because § 119 is not included in Chapter 15 of title 35 does not remove its applicability
to plant patents or suggest an acceptance of utility patents for plants.173 Chapter 15 includes no
discussion of priority rules174 to be applied to plant patent applications. Chapter 15 incorporates
the rules of other chapters, including chapter 11 of title 35 regarding applications for patents175
and the priority rules included therein.176 A minor addition to the priority rules of patent
applications, which is applicable to plant patent applications, cannot evidence Congressional
acceptance of § 101 covering plants.
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IV.

Conclusion
In 1977, when a court first accepted that a living organisms could be patentable under

§ 101 it wrote that it was aware that there were “fears that our holding will of necessity, or
‘logically,’ make all new, useful, and unobvious species of plants, animals, and insects created
by man patentable, we think the fear is far-fetched.”177 When the Supreme Court expanded § 101
to include sexually reproduced plants it dismissed fears that its reading would destroy the
PVPA’s exemptions to save seeds and allow for research to continue on protected plants.178 But
in 2013, the Supreme Court ensured that those PVPA exemptions, intended to secure plant
diversity, were rendered meaningless by granting near absolute protection to the progeny of selfreplicating patented plants.179 The Supreme Court continually turned a blind eye to the
repercussions of its decisions as it continually has expanded § 101 patent eligible subject matter
to nearly all living things. When Congress has legislated in a particular area, the Court’s job “is
the narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that
is done our powers are exhausted.”180 Here, the Court failed that task. The Court failed to address
the specific conflicts created by judicial expansion of § 101 coverage into areas previously
controlled by the PPA and the PVPA.
Congress can and should overrule the Supreme Court by adding a single sentence into the
PVPA or the PPA to indicate that they were and still are intended to be the exclusive venues of
protecting plants. The right to grant patents is one of the few powers explicitly granted to
Congress in the Constitution.181 As was stated by the Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty:

177

In re Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1038.
J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. at 141 n.12.
179
Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761.
180
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318.
181
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (West 2013) (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
178

It is the role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the
patent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the composition sought to be
patented uniquely implicates matters of public concern.182
A simple modification to either plant specific legislation would reestablish Congress in its
intended roll as the body defining patentable subject matter.
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